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FEMINIST APPROACHES TO SEXUALITY AND LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
Rosemary Auchmuty 
The workshop at which this paper was presented was directed at doctoral and early career scholars in 
law.  My aim was to show how mainstream Sexuality and Law scholarship is dominated by masculine 
concerns and methodologies and to suggest how, using feminist approaches, scholarship might be 
more accurate and inclusive.  Feminism is a broad church, embracing many theoretical strands.  I 
would emphasise, however, that employing a feminist approach is not simply a choice of position 
among many others; it is an essential element in good scholarship.  Without the feminist 
considerations I am about to outline, the end product of the research will simply be incomplete.1   
Beyond theory 
A feminist approach is one that foregrounds gender.  Indeed, “feminist” is the adjective that is applied 
to scholarship about gender; gender would not have become an issue for scholarship or law if it had 
not been brought to their attention by feminists.  Feminist approaches remind us that the world is not 
composed solely of men; that women have different experiences from men; that the sexes exist in 
relation to each other, and that this is a relationship not simply of inequality but often of overt 
discrimination and oppression.  The fact that there were no women in the UK legal professions until 
1920, for example, was not because no woman wanted to practise as a lawyer before that date; it was 
because men used every possible means, legal and extra-legal, to keep them out (Auchmuty 2011).   
Feminist scholarship developed from second wave of feminism in the 1970s.  This is not to 
say that feminist critiques did not exist before then, rather that they were not regarded as serious 
research until feminists entered the academy in substantial numbers in the 1980s.  Feminism came late 
to law and, while now an accepted and growing field, it remains separate and marginal; it is still 
possible for law students to meet no feminist input throughout their entire degree programme.  Only 
this week I was shown a new textbook on Jurisprudence that gave no attention to either women or 
feminist jurisprudence in its entire 120,000 word length.2  The publisher seemed surprised when I 
expressed concern; while fully aware that women make up more than half our law students (and the 
market for his books), he had simply not noticed there was nothing in this book that applied 
specifically to women.3   
 Sexuality scholarship has developed over the same period through two quite separate 
theoretical strands, themselves gendered.  Gay liberation emerged after the legalisation of gay male 
sex in 1967.  But its focus on male concerns, such as the unequal age of consent and restrictions on 
public sex, and its disregard for women’s concerns, such as custody of children, led to many women 
shifting their allegiance to the women’s movement in the early 1970s.  Lesbian feminism introduced 
sexuality into a movement hitherto perceived to represent only heterosexual women and socialist 
issues (Auchmuty 2000: 783).  More recently, feminists in the academy have found allies among 
queer theorists, many of them men sympathetic to women’s concerns (e.g. Stychin 1995).  But large 
sections of the gay male population have remained untouched by feminism, so that much sexuality 
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scholarship produced by men continues to ignore gender, while still using the universalist tone that 
purports to speak for everyone.4  
Beyond the male 
The classic problem that pervades all knowledge and all scholarship, such as the Jurisprudence text I 
mentioned above, is the simple absence of women in mainstream work; the use of universal words to 
describe the experience of one sex only; the continuing acceptability of accounts that focus solely on 
male concerns. When people hear or use the words “gay” and “homosexual”, it is men they see in 
their mind’s eye, men whose experiences they imagine or describe.  The consequence is not simply 
that lesbians become invisible, they become implicated in male gay practices (both sexual and social) 
which actually they are much less likely, and heterosexual men much more likely, to engage in.  
Women form a tiny proportion of sexual abusers, lesbians even fewer, but that did not stop the courts 
from denying lesbian mothers custody of their own children for decades.  During the AIDS crisis, 
when lesbians (the least vulnerable group) rallied round to attack the culture of gay-bashing and help 
care for their ill gay friends, their own concerns were moved off the gay agenda as unimportant in the 
face of this life-changing epidemic. 
 What is clear then is that lesbians are often situated in a very different place from gay men, 
just as heterosexual women are situated differently from heterosexual men.  It is not an essential 
difference; indeed, a central feature of feminism is that gender is socially constructed, and our goal is 
the abolition of gender, that is, the creation of a world in which one’s biological sex makes no social 
difference.  But, as long as gender does make a difference, the first question the scholar of sexuality 
and law must ask of her sources is: Is the situation different for men and for women?  Does this law 
apply equally and in the same way to men and women?  Who campaigned for it, and why?  Who 
benefits?  (Auchmuty 1997). 
 Answering these questions usually gives the lie to any assumption of identity of interests 
among lesbians and gay men.  Some examples: consensual sex between adult men in private was 
illegal between 1885 and 1967.  So in one sense lesbians, who were outside this law, were less 
vulnerable to legal intervention and the danger of harassment, humiliation and blackmail.  But that is 
not to say that lesbians were unaffected: on the one hand, their absence from legal recognition 
rendered them silent and invisible for decades, yet, when prosecuted under other provisions such as 
sexual assault, they were subjected to excessive penalties, as is usually the case with female offenders 
(Derry 2007).  It is this last part that is usually ignored in accounts of Sexuality and Law, which may 
be unclear about whether “sodomy” laws actually applied to women as well as men or, alternatively, 
may assume that lesbians lived easy lives untouched by legal and social opprobrium. 
Even today, with criminalisation behind us, lesbians and gay men experience the law 
differently.  Take the Civil Partnership Act 2004, which allows same-sex couples to register their 
partnership and acquire more or less the same rights and responsibilities as heterosexual married 
couples.5  Largely campaigned for by men, often for financial reasons (inheritance tax featured 
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prominently in the publicity), the civil partnership has proved less attractive for women – often, again, 
for financial reasons.  Men are more likely to have property they want to protect and pass on through 
inheritance and pensions.  Women are likely to be poorer, so these provisions are of no practical use 
to the majority, and may indeed be detrimental, as where benefits are calculated on a household 
basis.6  This law treats lesbians and gays equally, but lesbians as a group do not benefit from it in the 
same way as men as a group.   
So, the first principle is to “ask the woman question”, and do not assume an identity of 
interests between lesbians and gay men.  The truth is that lesbians have more in common with 
heterosexual women than with gay men, simply because of the gendered differences and inequalities 
that still dominate society.  That means, for library work, that searches should be made under 
“lesbian” as well as “gay” and “homosexual”; that work by women as well as men should be 
consulted; and that where the scholar finds that only the male experience appears to be described, this 
should be noted and problematised. 
Beyond the middle-class, white, coupled male 
The person envisaged in much of the recent civil partnership/same-sex marriage literature is the 
worthy male citizen, the employed or retired man long settled with a partner in a home they own.  He 
thinks it’s unfair he can’t get married like his heterosexual friends.  He thinks it’s unfair that if he or 
his partner dies, inheritance tax will be payable on his estate because their house is now worth three-
quarters of a million pounds.  He thinks it’s unfair that his life insurance policy costs more than a 
heterosexual man’s because gay men are associated with a higher risk of sexually transmitted disease.  
So he campaigns for law reform, and he gets it: and now (mark my words) he will be focusing on gay 
men’s access to reproductive rights.  But, as Neil Cobb has written in an excellent article on this issue, 
the removal of the sexually transmitted disease presumption in insurance policies for gay men does 
nothing for those of African origin travelling to Africa who will still pay more because they, too, are 
presumed to be at greater risk of HIV/AIDS (Cobb 2010).  Likewise, civil partnerships and same-sex 
marriage, with their legal and social privileges, do nothing for uncoupled gays and lesbians, and 
single people generally.  And I predict that access to reproductive rights will be claimed by many gay 
men without thought for the exploitation of commercial surrogate mothers in third-world countries.7   
 It is important, then, to consider the situation of all gays and lesbians, and all people 
generally, not simply the relatively privileged campaigners for yet more privileges, who often seem to 
disregard those excluded from those privileges or actually made more vulnerable by the dominant 
group’s new access to “rights”.  The gay rights literature is dominated by this narrow, self-interested 
kind of scholarship.  Seeking out specifically feminist accounts, especially those that foreground 
class, is essential.8 
Beyond rights 
Notwithstanding their differences, the theoretical underpinnings of women’s liberation and gay 
liberation in the 1970s had one thing in common: an analysis of power.  The incorporation of the 
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European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law in 1998 led to a new legal consciousness 
conceived in terms of rights, leading in turn to the dominant discourse today of equality and diversity.  
Thus the old political basis of both Gender and Sexuality and Law scholarship, which focused on the 
ways that dominant groups (heterosexuals, men) oppress subordinate groups (homosexuals, women), 
gave way to a liberal call for inclusion for some, but not all, individuals and groups.  A rights analysis 
of necessity categorises people into identity groups and, where women were once seen as a separate 
identity group from men, when sexuality became the defining characteristic gays and lesbians were 
grouped together and the gendered differences simply disappeared from attention.  These days, where 
people once spoke of the “lesbian and gay” community (Auchmuty, Jeffreys and Miller 1992), we see 
“LGBT” (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) and recently I saw “LGBTQI” (lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex) all lumped together as one “community”.  In truth, of 
course, each of these groups has separate and sometimes conflicting interests.  That is not to say that 
lesbians might not sometimes choose to ally themselves politically with gay men, as they did in the 
campaign against section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988 which prohibited the “promotion” of 
homosexuality by schools and local authorities.  But what generally happens when women work 
together with men is that the men’s voices dominate and their interests prevail.  In the anti-section 28 
campaign, gay men argued that homosexuality could not be promoted, since homosexuals were born, 
not made.  The lesbian feminist analysis – that sexuality is socially constructed, not inborn – was 
drowned out, even though it reflected many women’s personal experience of moving from a 
heterosexual to a lesbian identity.  For these reasons, then, researchers should avoid the mindless 
conflation of lesbian, gay, transgender and the rest; they should be precise about who exactly is 
encompassed in any discussion and, where necessary, include the separate and different experiences 
and analyses of all groups.   
Beyond equality 
Current debates in Sexuality and Law are almost always conceptualised in terms of equality. There is 
nothing wrong with equality, but it misses the point for feminism, whose goal is not simply to be 
included in the status quo, but to transform it.  Historically, women have not simply been unequal to 
men, they have been oppressed by them and the institutions of patriarchy constructed to perpetuate 
male power.  Gays and lesbians, similarly, have not just been unequal to heterosexuals; they have 
been oppressed by them and the institutions of heterosexism and homophobia constructed to 
perpetuate the heteropatriarchy. 
 Equality has never been women’s first priority.  First-wave feminists in nineteenth-century 
Britain were not simply campaigning for equal rights to education, work, property, the vote, as they 
have far too often been characterised; they were fighting to remove the oppressive and unjust laws 
that gave men power to dominate, exploit and exclude them and to control their property and their 
bodies.  In other words, women needed to get men off their backs before they could even think of 
working towards equality (Auchmuty 2008).  Likewise, for all the gays and lesbians who have been 
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able to come out and be fully accepted at home and at work and even to get married as a result of the 
huge liberal shifts in mainstream society in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, there 
are many others who still suffer not simply generalised inequality but ideological and familial 
pressures, social ostracism, violence and even death for their sexual choices.   
 So a Sexuality and Law analysis that stops short at rights and equality is an incomplete one.  
First, in pressing for equality, we need to consider whether we really want equality with dominant 
groups who for centuries have perpetuated their own power through oppressive practices such as 
those we now abhor in other parts of the world or “other” communities at home.  Second, we need to 
think about changing the world: challenging heterosexual power, shifting behaviour and attitudes and, 
as many feminists have argued, making heterosexuals more like us – more egalitarian, less gendered 
in their relationships, more inclusive in their communities.   
Beyond law 
Feminists are cautious about looking to law to tackle injustice.  The expectation that a change in the 
law will solve our difficulties is naïve and has proved disappointing for women time and time again.  
Today, for example, we have very severe rape laws, but we still have a high rate of rape and a low 
rate of convictions.  Dominant structures have a way of negotiating legal barriers, reconfiguring 
debates and finding a way to return to the preferred status quo or something close.   
 What we need, much more than legal change, is attitudinal change; and, while the two are 
clearly linked – the change in public opinion towards gays and lesbians was in large part driven by the 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 – it is education that is the key to our liberation.  The more people know 
about law and sexuality and the more that rational argument is available to counter prejudice and 
religious dogma, the more individuals will be empowered to take control of their own lives and make 
sensible decisions without needing to look to law’s partial and inadequate protection.   
 Alongside education, we need to think in terms of politics.  Feminism is both an intellectual 
analysis and a politics, and Sexuality and Law scholars need to locate their research in the context of a 
rapidly changing society in which long-held values of compassion and solidarity are being removed 
one by one, to be replaced by ideology-driven policies without evidential basis, whose goal will surely 
be, intentionally or not, the erosion of the equality and diversity we have worked so hard to achieve.  
As Homa Khaleeli wrote in the Guardian on 28 October 2014, “Feminism is not just about wishing 
for women to have the same rights and opportunities as men: it is a movement created to ensure that it 
happens.” Sexuality and Law scholarship must go beyond the “me-too” equal-rights agenda to see 
connections and make alliances with other social movements and return to political struggle, not 
simply legal reform, to get the world we want.  For legal researchers, this means looking beyond the 
law shelves in the library to search the sociology, social history, political science and literature 
offerings for information about political movements, especially feminism, that have led and will lead 
to legal change. 
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1 Feminist work in Sexuality and Law can be found scattered across most socio-legal journals, especially 
Feminist Legal Studies, and in edited collections such as Munro and Stychin 2007. 
2 I will not shame it by naming the book or its publisher. 
3 For a small sample of feminist jurisprudence collections, just to show that this is not a new area, see Barnett 
1996, Barnett 1998, Bowman et al 2010, Dowd and Jacobs 2006, Fineman et al 2009, Levit and Verchik 2006, 
Olsen 1995, Richardson and Sandland 2000, Smith 1993.  
4 Much of the literature civil partnership and same-sex marriage falls into this category. 
5 The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 confers the same rights as civil partnership. 
6 Prior to 2005 same-sex couples were treated as two individuals (thus attracting higher benefits) because their 
relationship was not recognised in law.  See Auchmuty 2007. 
7 At the very workshop at which I presented this paper, a young male doctoral student asked me what the 
problem was for the women surrogates from third-world countries: ‘Isn’t it just a contract?’, he said.  Rights did 
not come into it, nor the risks of pregnancy and childbirth, nor even the unequal bargaining power of the 
respective parties. 
8 For example, there are dozens of books by men (mostly American) on same-sex marriage, all presenting the 
same liberal arguments.  Researchers on this topic should be directed to Barker 2012 for a feminist view. 
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